This Week in the Sharing Economy: Late Edition

In lieu of real content, another set of links.

Picks of the week:

Peers.org:

Airbnb:

Industry:

  • Google invests in housecleaning as Peers member Homejoy hits it big. Homejoy is a Peers partner, but its “professional” employees are, according to Forbes, people who need to show proof of employment to receive government assistance, recruited through municipal employment services.
  • DHL launches its MyWays delivery service, powered by “people who want to deliver parcels and earn some extra money”. Does Peers approve?
  • Meanwhile, Flatclub is like Airbnb but only if you went to a fancy university. Sharing without the hoi polloi.
  • There is a cynicism to the simplistic claim that “systems are broken” and that technology can fix them.
  • Accenture continues to be interested.
  • Lots of actual careers going at Uber (not drivers), Airbnb (not B&B owners), Homejoy (not cleaners).

Softball questions from the media:

Taxis and ridesharing:

This Week in the Sharing Economy: The Move to Professionalism

In separate announcements, two of the most well-capitalized sharing-economy companies (Lyft and Airbnb) announced moves away from their “sharing” and co-operative roots. I suggested they would at the end of this post:

To be successful, the venture-capital-funded “sharing economy” will be forced to lose all those aspects of informal sharing that makes “sharing” attractive, and to keep those aspects that erode neighbourhoods, erode employment rights, and remove basic standards. And if they succeed, they will have used the language of sharing to bring about an unregulated, free-market, neoliberal economy.

In September Lyft, Sidecar, and Uber (with its Uber X service) were approved in California as a new class of “Transportation Network Companies”. Now both Lyft and Sidecar have done away with the pretence that the money passing from passenger to driver was a “donation” and have instituted a system of formal fares (as Uber already does). The idea that passengers may pay more or less than the suggested donation, which is a part of the casual and informal nature of the exchanges that sharing economy companies appeal to, is now gone for Californians.

In a separate move, Lyft has instituted a new “surge pricing” initiative, which amounts to requiring a 25% additional payment to drivers during periods of heavy demand. Similar to Uber’s surge pricing, this move appeals directly to price as a means of rationing, and assumes that drivers are motivated primarily by money, despite the heavy use of community-focused language that Lyft uses in its marketing. We’ll have to see if the attempt by Taxi companies to raise money to push back gains any momentum.

These moves are part of a rapid shift of the Venture Capital-funded part of the transport side of the sharing economy. They follow the sale of Lyft’s original Zimride Carpool service to rental-car giant Enterprise in July, the sale of Zipcar to Avis Budget in January, and the shift of RelayRides to longer-term rentals. The moves are a fascinating contrast to the success of French company Blablacar, which has a model much closer to the original carpool idea, is growing by leaps and bounds, and is now moving into the UK.

The best treatment I’ve seen of the latest changes in this transport area is by Liz Gannes at All Things D.

The other big announcement came from Airbnb, at a press conference at their very fancy headquarters. In addition to announcing new versions of their mobile apps, CEO Brian Chesky stepped away from his “our hosts are regular people” line to tell them “You’re in the business of hospitality”. Airbnb is bringing back a program calls Superhost, which “is meant to identify and reward some of the platform’s most active and highly recommended hosts”; as well as offering a Host Rewards Program to encourage people to rent more often. So again there is a move away from regular people “occasionally” renting a room out and earning a little extra money, to a revenue model that is driven by higher volume hosts. Airbnb already relies on these increasingly professional hosts for a significant chunk of its revenue as I showed in my look at its New York data: that trend is only going to accelerate.

Again, this week’s steps are part of a rapid movement. Over the last year Airbnb has moved towards a more formal security and identification system, demanding government documents as proof of identity along with the usual Facebook information. Not, it seems, that relying on positive reviews is foolproof, as a Washington DC woman found out recently. Airbnb Brian Chesky increasingly refers to his hosts as “micro-entrepreneurs”: emphasizing the market-driven view of the business that he has, and again moving away from a community model of sharing. The term started, I think, with TaskRabbit, another “sharing” company that is walking the same path: less community, more temp agency in Rabbit’s clothing.

Push back from cities from Berlin and Paris to Roanoke City in Virginia to Grand Rapids in Michigan to Vancouver is growing, and the New York Case continues to roll on, with one notorious Airbnb landlord settling with the city. The danger here is that Airbnb’s hubris will damage other, less arrogant and less revenue-hungry companies who have engaged in apartment rentals for years (including the lovely one in Rome I was lucky enough to rent last spring) and that the venture capitalists, instead of bringing in a new level of sharing, will clumsily damage what’s already there.

Airbnb Business in New York, Revisited

Since I did a post about Airbnb’s business in New York, Airbnb has published its own study and so there has been some follow-up interest in my numbers, here, here, and here.

The data and the conclusions cannot be conclusive because they are a sample (though a big one) of limited publicly-available information. I’m happy to be corrected, but Airbnb would have to release some real numbers to do so, instead of silly 300 word “studies”.

I don’t have new data, and I think there is enough detail in the original post to understand the sources and the limits of the analysis, but here is a PDF presentation that tries to make the conclusions a bit more clear. Here is a version formatted for download and printing.

[gview file=”http://tomslee.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/airbnbny.pdf” profile=”3″ save=”0″]

This Week in the Sharing Economy (November 8 2013 Edition)

Another collection of links (about 75) with almost no commentary. There’s so much happening this may be a regular feature.

This Week in the Sharing Economy

Notes on Airbnb’s New York Business

[Update, Nov 10: clearer explanation here. PDF for download here.]

Two recent Airbnb blog posts make statements about its business in New York. One is from David Hantman, Airbnb’s public policy head hired from being Yahoo’s head of government relations, and it is here. The other is from CEO Brian Chesky, here.

I was interested in whether there are other ways to frame the picture that Chesky paints of the Airbnb business in New York, so I wrote a bit of python that downloaded as many New York listings as I could find and stuck them in a database, and here’s a few notes from what they show. I collected 9527 places rented by 7112 hosts in New York. Airbnb claims 15,000 hosts, but I suspect the others are not doing much business because the searches I did over several days did not find them.

In New York, our 15,000 hosts are regular people from all five boroughs. Eighty-seven percent of them rent the homes in which they live.

Of the 7112 hosts I found, 6038 rent one room, which is 85%. An even greater percentage (92%) rent from a single address, but there is no way to confirm if it is “the home in which they live”. These numbers are close enough to show that the data set is representative of the overall population.

But looking at it another way, only 63% (6038 of 9527) of rooms are single-room offerings (that is, a host who offers only one place to stay). And only 53% (60439 of 114659) of bookings are in single-room offerings (using reviews as a proxy for bookings). Assuming the same length of stay in each place, the amount of revenue that comes from single-room renters is 54%. That is, very nearly half of Airbnb’s business is from hosts who are renting multiple offerings.

The vast majority of these hosts are everyday New Yorkers who occasionally share the home in which they live.

“Share the home” is open to interpretation. The stories that Chesky tells are all of people staying in their home while guests are present, which is the flavour of “sharing” that I get from the statement. But the majority of New York listings (5380 of 9527, or 56%) are for “entire home or apartment” compared to 3636 “private room” and only 511 “shared room”. The same percentage of bookings and 73% of total revenue comes from “entire home or apartment” rentals. The amount of Airbnb revenue that comes from people sharing a part of their home while they stay in it is only just over a quarter.

Chesky says that “If you want to understand Airbnb, you have to understand our beginnings” and describes how he and Joe Gebbia, both designers, had an idea when a design conference came to town: “why not turn our place into a bed and breakfast for the conference? We inflated air beds and called it the AirBed & Breakfast.” This sounds like a shared-room arrangement, but only 511 of 9527 offerings in New York are shared rooms (less than 6%) and less than 4% of the bookings are of this type. Today’s Airbnb has nothing to do with the “origin myth” that the company promotes.

So the Airbnb statements are not factually wrong, but are misleading: Airbnb’s financial interests do not align nearly as closely with its “community” as it claims.

RelayRides, GigaOm

Nice to see Mathew Ingram at GigaOm give a thoughtful precis and response to my Reputation Systems post.

Also, it’s timely to see today’s news that sharing economy company RelayRides has confirmed my predictions in its move away from its original market of hourly rentals and towards longer-term rentals, described in Wired, Forbes and elsewhere. Hourly rentals may appeal to “sharing” but monthly rentals is just commerce. It’s becoming more like a regular car rental company and less like a car-sharing company.

Why? Because of the demand for growth that faces VC funded companies, and according to Crunchbase RelayRides has been funded to the tune of $30m by investors including Google Ventures, General Motors, and others. Let’s hope that the boom and bust mentality behind these companies don’t have a bad effect on local initiatives like Community Carshare near me, which don’t have ambitions to disrupt the world but focus on doing something useful and actually cooperative.